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Non-technical summary
The broad literature focussing on the effects of globalization and strategic interactions
on corporate tax competition has widely neglected an impact of political factors. In this
paper, we analyse the effects of political factors on corporate taxation and in particular
the impact of partisanship.
In a first step we show in a simple theoretical Zodrow/Mieszkowski-style framework how
political ideologies can impact on decisions on corporate tax rates. Assuming heteroge-
neous decision-makers driven by self-interest in the political outcome and a probabilistic
voting model, two channels can be identified which point at different tax reaction func-
tions of left-wing and right-wing politicians: differences in public good preferences as well
as ideological biases in the perception of capital mobility. Both channels imply that right-
wing incumbents set lower corporate tax rates.
In the empirical section we make use of highly sophisticated data on ideological posi-
tions. These are derived from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data set, which
is based on the content analysis of party manifestos. This data enables much more so-
phisticated analyses of partisan politics than the data usually applied in public finance.
Applying panel data for 32 European countries since 1979, we can detect a significant
positive effect of left-wing legislatures on corporate tax rates. This effect, however, is
diminishing over time. Beyond this ideological effect, we identify two further political
factors which have interfered with the general pressure on cutting tax rates: the frag-
mentation of government, as well as the educational background of the respective head of
government. Moreover, our analysis by means of disaggregated ideology measures reveals
that especially the parties’ attitude towards the welfare state is a most relevant factor
which has a strong positive effect on corporate tax rates.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Die umfangreiche Literatur, die sich mit dem Einfluss der Globalisierung sowie von strate-
gischen Interaktionen auf den Ko¨rperschaftssteuerwettbewerb bescha¨ftigt, negiert weitest-
gehend einen Einfluss von politischen Faktoren auf die Unternehmensbesteuerung. In
diesem Papier untersuchen wir den Effekt von politischen Faktoren, insbesondere des
ideologischen Hintergrundes, auf die Unternehmensbesteuerung.
Zuna¨chst wird in einem einfachen Modell, das auf dem Ansatz von Zodrow und Miesz-
kowski beruht, aufgezeigt, wie politische Ideologien einen Einfluss auf Entscheidungen
u¨ber die Ko¨rperschaftssteuer nehmen ko¨nnen. Unter der Annahme von heterogenen
Entscheidungstra¨gern, die von Eigeninteresse in Form von ideologischen Pra¨ferenzen ge-
trieben werden, sowie einem Probabilistic Voting-Model, ko¨nnen zwei Kana¨le identifiziert
werden, die auf unterschiedliche Steuerreaktionsfunktionen von linken und rechten (kon-
servativen) Politikern hindeuten: Unterschiede bezu¨glich der Pra¨ferenzen fu¨r o¨ffentliche
Gu¨ter sowie ideologische Verzerrungen in der Wahrnehmung von Kapitalmobilita¨t. Beide
Kana¨le deuten darauf hin, dass linke Amtsinhaber ho¨here Unternehmenssteuern setzen
du¨rften.
Im empirischen Teil nutzen wir eine innovative Datengrundlage zur Messung ideologi-
scher Positionen. Diese stammt aus dem Datensatz des Comparative Manifesto Project
(CMP), der auf der Inhaltsanalyse von Wahlprogrammen beruht. Diese Daten erlauben
uns differenziertere Untersuchungen von ideologischen Effekten als die sonst in der fi-
nanzwissenschaftlichen Literatur verwendeten Daten. Unter der Verwendung von Panel-
daten fu¨r 32 europa¨ische Staaten seit 1979 ko¨nnen wir einen signifikant erho¨henden Ein-
fluss von linken Parteien auf die Ko¨rperschaftssteuern nachweisen. Dieser Effekt nimmt
jedoch im Zeitverlauf ab. Neben diesem ideologischen Effekt ko¨nnen wir zwei weitere
politische Faktoren identifizieren, die dem Steuersenkungsdruck entgegengewirkt haben:
die Fragmentierung der Regierungskoalition, sowie der Bildungshintergrund des jeweili-
gen Regierungschefs. Weiterhin zeigt unsere Untersuchung mittels disaggregierter Ideolo-
gievariablen, dass besonders die Parteiposition in Bezug auf den Sozialstaat einen ho¨chst
relevanten Faktor darstellt, der einen stark positiven Effekt auf die Ko¨rperschaftssteuern
ausu¨bt.
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1 Introduction
Over the last years, a number of empirical studies1 have been published that have signif-
icantly improved our understanding of corporate tax competition in the wake of global-
ization. These works mainly focus on the effects of globalization and strategic interaction
with neighboring countries on the national level of corporate taxation. However, the ef-
fects of political factors on corporate taxation and in particular the impact of partisan
politics have been widely neglected in the related literature. The purpose of our paper
is to extend this existing literature in two directions. First, we extend the theoretical
and empirical literature on international corporate tax competition by emphasizing the
relevance of politics in explaining corporate taxation at the national level. Second, we
propose the application of a sophisticated measure of political ideologies which allows for
more elaborate analyses of partisan effects on public finance outcomes than the measures
which are conventionally employed in the public economics literature.
Concerning the role of national decision-making processes in the international tax compe-
tition game, the related empirical works do not offer much evidence. Instead, the existing
literature seems to insinuate that corporate tax competition is an almost automatic pro-
cess in which governments inevitably lower their taxes due to the external pressure created
by increasing capital mobility or tax cuts of neighboring countries. This view also gets
its support from the theoretical literature, which is dominated by the Downsian approach
to policy convergence, reflected in the assumption that policy makers refer to the median
voter’s utility as determinant for their decisions. In this paper, we extend the traditional
tax competition model by assuming heterogeneous decision-makers driven by self-interest
in the political outcome and a probabilistic voting model as introduced by Calvert (1985).
Then, two channels can be identified which point to different tax reaction functions of
left-wing and right-wing politicians: differences in public good preferences as well as ide-
ological biases in the perception of capital mobility. Both channels imply that right-wing
incumbents set lower corporate tax rates.
The existing empirical studies hardly take account of such political factors, while only a
few of these papers control for political aspects such as the composition of government;
robust evidence is scarce. This is surprising given the bulk of evidence for partisan poli-
tics, especially in expenditure policies. Moreover, most recent survey-based evidence by
1See, among several others: Slemrod (2004); Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008); Overesch and
Rincke (2009b); Haufler, Klemm, and Schjelderup (2009); Heinemann, Overesch, and Rincke (2008).
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Heinemann and Janeba (2009) and Osterloh and Heinemann (2008) hints at the relevance
of political ideologies concerning related aspects of corporate tax policies, such as the
perception of the restrictions imposed by tax competition on national tax autonomy and
preferences for corporate tax harmonization in Europe. This low interest of the economic
literature in the political determinants of corporate tax policy also stands in sharp con-
trast to the political science literature. This has mainly focussed on the question whether
globalization has dampened the impact of partisan policies on fiscal policy and led to
some kind of “policy convergence” of opposed political camps. Moreover, further factors
that might influence corporate taxation at the national level have been widely ignored in
the related economic literature, e.g., the importance of fragmentation of national govern-
ments as well as the educational background of heads of states; the latter has only most
recently attracted some attention in the literature on fiscal policy outcomes. Thus, the
aim of the empirical part of the paper is to unite these strands of literature in order to
investigate the political determinants of corporate tax policies in Europe in the past 30
years, which exist beyond the widely analyzed factors related to globalization.
The methodological innovation of this paper is to integrate a sophisticated measure of
political ideologies in the empirical public finance literature. As we will show below, it is
vital to pursue high standards of data sources, as both relevant variables, corporate tax
burden, and especially political ideology cannot be expressed by one catch-all variable. In
this regard, we make use of two sophisticated data sets which overcome many drawbacks
of earlier studies. First, we use forward looking measures of corporate tax burdens, which
have become standard in the empirical analysis of strategic interaction in corporate tax
competition, but did not find much application beyond this regard and none in the re-
lated works in political economics. Second, we apply data on ideological positions derived
from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data set, which is based on the content
analysis of party manifestos. This data enables much more sophisticated analyses of par-
tisan politics than the data usually applied in public finance, which is almost exclusively
built on the use of dummies reflecting party family classifications. Furthermore, the latter
data has several disadvantages in panel analyses, which are resolved by our measure. In
particular, it enables us to detect international differences of party ideologies and their
changes over time. Moreover, we are able to disaggregate positions concerning different
policy areas, which allows us a much more explicit analysis of partisan effects on fiscal
policy than related research from public economics has been able to do.
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The structure of our paper is as follows: section 2 presents the theoretical background
for our analysis. In addition, the related empirical literature is stated. In section 3, we
present the used data and, in particular, we discuss the application of data on political
ideologies in explaining fiscal policy outcomes. The fourth section presents and discusses
the empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.
2 Ideology in Corporate Tax Competition
2.1 Basic model
The early theoretical literature on corporate tax competition, originating from the semi-
nal works by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986), does not deliver clear
predictions on potential influences of partisan politics. In this kind of model taxes are
usually assumed to be determined by benevolent decision-makers who maximize the utility
of a representative household or the median voter of the jurisdiction. Political ideologies
are only relevant in the models of Persson and Tabellini (1992, 1994), which both claim
that the median voter might have an interest to delegate tax policies to a politician with
an ideological position different from his own one. Nevertheless, these models do not give
leeway for partisan politics in corporate tax competition either, as the decision-maker
still implements the policy preferred by the median-voter, and delegation is only owed to
commitment problems in their two-period game structure. Consequently, differences in
the political couleur of the decision-maker should have no effect on the policy outcome in
all of these models.
Many subsequent works consider the individuals acting as decision-maker as being non-
benevolent. However, in this literature non-benevolence is not modelled by a political
ideology of the decision-maker which differs from that of the median voter, but by a pre-
defined self-interest of the decision-maker, which is reflected in his striving for political
rents. Non-benevolence is integrated in the early models by considering that the maxi-
mization of public revenue enters the decision maker’s utility function (see Edwards and
Keen (1996)). Only most recently models have emerged which consider politics in corpo-
rate tax competition more explicitly. Janeba and Schjelderup (2009) show that political
institutions are decisive in answering the question whether tax competition is welfare im-
proving when politicians are rent-seeking or have exogenous benefits from holding office.
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Similarly, Eggert and Sørensen (2008) analyze this question in a probabilistic voting model
under the premise that politicians seek reelection by distributing rents to employees of
the public sector.
Beyond these approaches which link theoretical models of corporate tax competition to
politics, the related theoretical literature is relatively scarce concerning the consideration
of partisan politics. However, the inclusion of a political bias in a standard tax competi-
tion model is straightforward, as will be demonstrated in the following. To illustrate this,
we use a model with n jurisdictions all inhabited by the identical number of citizens nor-
malized to unity2 which compete for completely mobile capital. For illustrative reasons,
we make some assumptions about the functional form, which have become standard in
the literature (see, e.g., Bucovetsky (forthcoming), or Brueckner and Saavedra (2001)).
Following these works, we assume a quadratic production function for each jurisdiction,
so that the output per capita in jurisdiction i depends on the locally employed capital per
capita (ki) and is defined as fi(ki) = aki − b2k2i . The constant-return to scale technology
is assumed to be identical for all jurisdictions. Each individual is initially endowed with
a capital amount of k¯, so that in the capital market equilibrium it has to hold that
n∑
i=1
ki ≤ nk¯. (1)
Capital is assumed to be completely mobile. This implies that the net return of capital ρ
(which is assumed to be positive) has to be equal in all jurisdictions, so that
ρ = a− bki − ti = a− bkj − tj (2)
for each j 6= i. Finally, following the papers stated above we assume that the utility
function of the representative citizen in jurisdiction i has a linear form:
ui = ci + αgi (3)
with α > 1 denoting the marginal utility of public consumption (gi) over the consumption
of a private numeraire good (ci). Private consumption originates from the compensation
of a fixed factor employed in local production (whose supply is fixed to unity), plus
2The consideration of unequal sizes simply adds the standard result of higher corporate taxation in
larger jurisdictions, which is well-known from Bucovetsky (1991), but does not affect the further results.
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the interest payment received for the supply of the initial capital endowment, so that
ci = fi(ki)−f ′i(ki)ki+ρk¯ = aki− b2k2i − (a− bki)ki+(a− bki− ti)k¯. Public consumption is
financed by a source tax on invested capital, so that the following public budget constraint
has to hold: gi = tiki.
Using (1) and (2), we can derive the quantity of capital allocated to jurisdiction i subject
to its own tax rate (ti) and the vector of tax rates of the other jurisdictions, j 6= i, i.e.
({tj}):
ki = k¯ +
1
b
(
1
n
n−1∑
j=1
tj − (n− 1
n
)ti) (4)
From this, we obtain the partial derivatives of the capital allocation in i and the interest
rate with respect to the own tax rate, which are:
∂ki
∂ti
= −(n− 1
n
)(
1
b
) (5)
and
∂ρ
∂ti
= −( 1
n
). (6)
In the benchmark case, the decision-maker of each jurisdiction i takes the tax rates of
his competitors as given and chooses his own tax rate in order to maximize the utility
of his representative citizen. Differentiation of the utility function with respect to ti and
equating to zero gives us
(−b∂ki
∂ti
ki +
∂ρ
∂ti
k¯) + α(ki + ti
∂ki
∂ti
) = 0. (7)
Inserting the values of ki, ∂ki∂ti and
∂ρ
∂ti
as calculated above, we can now solve the expression
for ti. This delivers us the tax reaction curve as perceived by jurisdiction i, with its tax
rate depending on the vector of all other tax rates t = (t1, ..., tn−1) as well as the total
number of competing jurisdictions, n:
ti =
(1− n+ nα)∑n−1j=1 tj + bk¯n2(α− 1)
(n− 1)(1 + n(2α− 1)) (8)
The resulting tax reaction function of i incorporates some stylized facts which are well-
known from the related empirical literature on international corporate tax competition in
Europe (which will be presented in the next subsection): the tax rate depends positively
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on the competitors’ tax rates ( ∂ti
∂tj
> 0), which accounts for the well-established finding
of strategic interaction in tax setting; the tax reaction function shifts downward with an
increase in the number of competitors n, (∂ti
∂n
< 0). Given all tj are equal, ti declines
in n which reflects the negative impact of globalization on corporate taxes. Based on
this reaction curve, the Nash solution for all tax rates can then be determined as the
intersection of the tax reaction curves of all n jurisdictions, which implies a symmetric
solution.
2.2 Integrating ideological bias
Up to this point, our model is dominated by the Downsian view of political competition,
which assumes that politicians in power are only interested in maximizing their chances
of reelection. Then, they unambiguously choose the same tax rate ti in order to maximize
the median voter’s utility (while taking his preference parameter α as given) without
consideration of their own interests. In this framework, which is basically at the bottom
of most theoretical contributions to the tax competition literature, the identity of the
decision-maker, such as ideological background which is reflected in party affiliation, has
no effect on the tax level. The tax rate is then only determined by the external factors
as shown above.
An explanation for the actual relevance of partisan politics can be found in the model by
Calvert (1985)3. His model assumes a self-interest of the candidates concerning the po-
litical outcome in combination with the assumption that candidates are uncertain about
the reaction of the voters (i.e., a probabilistic voting model)4. For simplicity, assume
that outcomes can be ordered in a one dimensional issue space, and citizens’ (i.e., vot-
ers and candidates) preferences on the outcome are single-peaked. Then, two candidates
with preferred outcomes at opposite sides of the median voter’s preferred outcome face a
trade-off when moving towards the median voter’s position: at the one hand it increases
their probability of winning which allows them the implementation of policy; at the other
other hand, any move away from their optimal policy outcome reduces the utility which
3Some further explanations for deviations from the Downsian prediction of policy convergence exist,
such as citizen-candidate models with entry costs (Osborne and Slivinski (1996)), or models of strategic
extremism which emerges due to information imperfection (Carrillo and Castanheira (2008)) or due to
abstention of voters (Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shapiro (2005)). See Fiorina (1999) for an extensive survey
on further approaches.
4Note that the models by Persson and Tabellini (2002, 2004) also assume that candidates are interested
in the policy outcome, but the deterministic voting procedure still leads to policy convergence to the
median voter’s preferred outcome.
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they derive from the implementation of policy. In the Nash equilibrium, partial conver-
gence takes place, but the chosen platforms still differ from that of the median voter. The
introduction of this kind of policy divergence into our simple tax competition model is
straightforward, and leads to two different explanations for a political bias in corporate
tax policy, (i) due to diverging preferences of incumbents, and (ii) due to diverging per-
ceptions of capital mobility.
Concerning the former, we assume that the candidates’ platforms reflect their preferences
for public goods. In this regard, the ideological continuum which is consistently regarded
as the most relevant in European national politics is the dichotomy of left and right:
leftist politicians are expected to feel more committed to an electorate which is poorer
than the average, so that they have a stronger interest in redistributive spending and a
higher level of public spending (see, e.g., Benoit and Laver (2006)), and the right vice
versa. This divergence of preferences for public goods spending enters our model via the
variable α, which was in our basic model assumed to be the representative citizen’s (or
median voter’s) preference for public goods. Due to the assumption of convergence to
the median based on the Downsian model, this variable was assumed to be the same for
every decision-maker notwithstanding his identity, e.g. his political affiliation. However,
assuming a preference-motivated partisan effect on tax setting, we therefore have to in-
sert a diverging preference parameter αd for decision-maker d, with αd defined over the
ideological continuum. Due to the partial convergence assumption it has to hold that
1 < αˆr ≤ αr < αm < αl ≤ αˆl, for m=median, r=right and l=left; the values with “hat”
denote the most preferred parameters for the two parties, respectively. Consequently, the
platform chosen by the leftist decision-maker yields a value for the parameter α which
is between his optimal point αˆl and the median voter’s preferred value αm, and strictly
higher than the value at the platform of the right-wing candidate, which is αr.
Comparative statics of the tax reaction function (8) yields ∂ti
∂αd
> 0. Therefore, we ex-
pect a more leftist politician, as he has a higher preference for public goods, to impose a
higher tax on capital. However, it is important to point out that this ideological bias on
corporate tax setting is exclusively driven by diverging partisan attitudes towards public
expenditure. Any left-right discrepancies in other political areas, such as societal policies,
should not have an impact on corporate taxes via this channel.
Secondly, partisanship can also have an impact on fiscal policy outcomes through different
perceptions of the environment. In this regard, the mobility of capital (∂ki
∂ti
) plays a crucial
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role in the model presented above. As is customary in standard tax competition models,
it is assumed that the decision-maker has complete knowledge of this elasticity. Such a
strong assumption, however, is problematic, as in reality the elasticity is unobservable.
Therefore, we assume that capital mobility enters the tax reaction function with a sub-
jective error d of the policy-maker d5, so that the perceived elasticity which underlies the
tax reaction function (8) becomes (˜∂ki
∂ti
)
d
= ∂ki
∂ti
+ d. Inserting this into the tax reaction
function gives us the new expression:
tdi = ti −
bn2(n
∑n−1
j=1 tjα
2 + bk¯(−1 + n(1 + α(nα− 1))))d
(n− 1)(1 + n(2α− 1))((n− 1)(n− 1− 2nα) + bn(1 + n(α− 1))d) (9)
Partial derivation yields ∂t
d
i
∂d
< 0, thus a perception of higher mobility induces the choice
of a lower corporate tax rate.
A partisan bias in corporate tax setting thus emerges in case biased perceptions of capital
mobility are systematically linked to political platforms. This claim can be confirmed
by most recent evidence from Heinemann and Janeba (2009). In a survey directed at
parliamentarians of the German parliament (Bundestag), they disclose that left-wing and
right-wing politicians differ significantly in their perceptions of capital mobility, with left
ones assuming real capital to be less mobile and investing decisions to be less dependent on
taxation than right-wing politicians perceive it.6 Consequently, this channel again implies
that left-wing decision-makers tend to levy higher corporate taxes than their right-wing
counterparts.
Moreover, Heinemann and Janeba (2009) discuss that systematically biased perceptions
might also be caused by the individual background of politicians. In particular, they
argue that the educational specialization should contribute to the degree of information
about globalization restrictions which directly impacts the mobility of capital. Most
recent evidence from Dreher et al. (2009) shows that the educational backgrounds of
heads of government indeed have a significant impact on policy outcomes, such as the
implementation of market-liberalizing reforms. Although Heinemann and Janeba (2009)
cannot identify a significantly different perception of German parliamentarians with a
final degree in economics or business administration, the consideration of the educational
5With d > −(n−1n )( 1b ), so that the reaction of capital on increasing taxes is in any case negative.
6The mechanism behind the finding, however, remains unclear, but it may be conjectured that politi-
cians’ perceptions on these matters are at least partly shaped by the direct contact with interest groups
(e.g., entrepreneurs in the case of right-wing politicians), so that the bias could be attributed to different
preferences of related interest groups.
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background of the decision-makers constitutes a further promising approach for explaining
differences in corporate taxation in Europe.
In sharp contrast to all these considerations, it is frequently objected that globalization
has rendered ideological differences in national fiscal politics in general, and tax policy
in particular, irrelevant.7 Although empirical evidence concerning corporate taxation is
scarce, this view is very popular among political scientists, such as Ganghof (2006: 141),
who argues that “if socio-economic constraints are tight, parties’ policy preferences are
likely to converge. By extension, left and right governments will implement similar policies
and left and right veto players will not have much difficulty agreeing on policy change”.
Following this objection, we would expect a decline in the course of time (or even a
complete absence) of partisan effects in corporate tax policy – even in the face of still
diverging “general” political platforms (which still have an impact on policy outcomes
in other policy areas, but not in fiscal policies). Moreover, other strands of literature
suggest that the partisan effect on corporate taxation might even be quite the opposite.
This view can be justified by the argument from Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) that
unpopular but necessary political decisions (such as which cuts in corporate taxation are
to be regarded) are more easily implemented by “unusual characters”.8 In the same vein,
Garrett (1995) claims that left-wing governments have to pay a “political premium” in
form of lower corporate tax rates in order to attract investors.
The objective of the following empirical section is to disclose whether the partisan effects
outlined above did in fact play a significant role in the European tax competition of the
last decades.
2.3 Empirical findings of partisan effects
The impact of partisanship on fiscal policy has frequently been analyzed in the empirical
public finance literature. However, the lion’s share of empirical studies focusses on the ex-
penditure side of the public budgets. The most recent panel-analysis for OECD countries
in the 1980s and 90s by Potrafke (2009) reveals that left-wing governments spent more
on social expenditures than their right-wing counterparts in times when globalization was
proceeding faster; however, generally speaking, partisan effects weakened in the 1990s.
7This argument is elaborated in greater detail in Garrett (1998).
8One anecdotal example for this view is the tax reform in Germany in 2000, which was implemented
by a left-wing coalition of social democrats and the green party after many years of inaction under a
right-wing led coalition.
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The work by Cusack (1997) using earlier data on OECD countries identifies the presence
of partisan policies in expenditure policies as well.9 Interestingly enough, with regard to
expenditure policies, both works find evidence in support of the hypothesis that the effect
of partisan politics has declined over time. However, out of the large number of related
studies – a meta-study by Imbeau, Petry, and Lamari (2001) quotes 43 studies mainly
focussing on expenditure policies – the work by Bräuninger (2005) has the highest rele-
vance for our approach. This paper applies the same kind of data on ideological positions
as we do and which will be discussed in greater detail in the data section. Furthermore,
he shows that only ideological differences defined as programmatic preferences have an
impact on the level and mix of expenditure.
In contrast to the literature concerning expenditure policies, taxation in general and
corporate taxation in particular, has scarcely been analyzed directly in the economic lit-
erature on partisan politics.10 This is remarkable, since a large number of papers with the
objective of explaining the evolution of corporate taxation in the past decades has been
published most recently. These papers, however, primarily focus on the impact of glob-
alization on corporate taxation (by using different measures such as trade and financial
openness, or sophisticated composite indicators), or they concentrate on the direct inter-
action of countries in the tax-setting game for mobile capital by applying sophisticated
empirical techniques borrowed from spatial econometrics.
Some of these papers make use of political control variables (see Table 1 for an overview
of recent works including political variables) – but by no means all of them, as even one
of the most cited studies, Slemrod (2004), dismisses a possible partisan impact in its em-
pirical model. The results concerning partisan effects are mixed: most do not discover
any significant effect at all, and for those studies which do uncover an effect, the direction
of the partisan effect is ambiguous. In these works, both left-wing and right-wing govern-
ments are found to provide a higher taxation of companies.
Remarkable differences can be detected for works published in journals either with a focus
on economics or political science. First, some articles of the latter group offer a much wider
spectrum of variables concerning political ideology (such as government fragmentation)
and a more sophisticated measurement of ideology as discussed below, while the papers
9For earlier evidence in the same direction, see, e.g., de Haan and Sturm (1994).
10Few works focus on partisan effects on taxation at the subnational level. Reed (2006) finds evidence
for partisan effects for US state legislatures on the personal tax burden, and Allers, de Haan, and Sterks
(2001) for property taxation of Dutch municipalities.
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from the economic literature almost exclusively rely on simple dummy variables which
indicate the ideology of the government. Second, there is a tendency in the economic
literature to apply a much wider spectrum of measures of corporate tax burdens than
in political science, where usually the method proposed by Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar
(1994) (MRT in the table) is applied. Their method, however, has several drawbacks for
the analysis of the question at hand, as will be discussed in the data section.
2.4 Effect of government fragmentation
One further political effect that has been widely neglected in the economic literature
on corporate tax competition is the relevance of government fragmentation. In contrast
to this, political science literature pays much attention to the influences of veto power
in decision-making. However, among the papers cited in Table 1, only two consider the
inclusion of variables related to the fragmentation of governments in their regressions. This
is remarkable, since the economic literature has for some time now confirmed the relevance
of the so-called “weak government hypothesis” for fiscal policy (Roubini and Sachs (1989)),
which claims in its original version that larger (in terms of the number of involved parties)
and ideologically more heterogenous coalitions find it harder to balance their budgets after
an external shock. In an application to taxation, Ashworth and Heyndels (2001) show
that more fragmented governments need more time to realign their tax structures after
an external shock has shifted it away from an ideal tax structure.
The relevance of these arguments for corporate tax competition is evident: they point
to a higher persistence of corporate taxes under weak governments. As corporate tax
cuts are usually a controversial undertaking, weak governments are expected to react less
flexibly to a changing environment. During the period of investigation, the competition
intensity increased markedly and almost all countries reacted to this by decreasing their
tax burdens. This implies that weak governments have carried out less (or smaller) cuts
of corporate taxation than more homogenous coalitions (inevitably leading to a – at least
temporally – higher level of tax rates), which will be tested in the following sections as
well.
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3 Data
Both tax burdens as well as political ideologies are multi-dimensional concepts which
cannot be expressed by the “one and only” index number. As the overview in Table
1 reveals, several different measures of corporate tax burdens and ideologies have been
applied in the related literature. In the following, we will present and discuss the most
appropriate concepts for the empirical operationalization of these two dimensions.
3.1 Measuring tax burdens
The empirical literature analyzing international corporate tax competition which has
evolved in recent years (such as Devereux et al. (2008) or Overesch and Rincke (2009b)),
has come along with more sophisticated methods of measuring corporate tax rates. In
line with this, we employ statutory tax rates and effective tax rates as most appropriate
tax measures for our analysis. It stands out from the earlier literature – especially that
from political science – which mostly uses data on implicit tax rates calculated according
to the method proposed by Mendoza et al. (1994). This measure determines an average
tax rate by dividing tax revenues of pretax corporate profits, both based on data from
national accounts statistics. A first obvious drawback of such implicit rates is the fact
that they already reflect reactions to tax laws. Moreover, as discussed by Haufler et al.
(2009) and Devereux et al. (2008), such implicit tax rates have the decisive disadvantage
that changes in their values do not necessarily have to reflect changes in the underlying
tax laws. These can also be caused by business cycle fluctuations or other factors which
do not belong to the responsibility of the government, and for which it is empirically not
entirely possible to control. Hence, this indicator even fluctuates regularly during years in
which the national tax system is not subject to any legal change. This, however, implies
for our analysis that these measures are misleading, as it is our primary concern to explain
the impact of political factors on corporate taxation.
In our analysis we will employ two different types of measures: statutory corporate income
tax rates (CITR) and effective tax rates. The obvious drawback of the use of the former
is its complete neglect of the definition of the tax base. However, statutory tax rates
are probably the most visible element of the national corporate tax system and hence
an important element of tax policy. Moreover, they constitute the relevant variable for
profit-shifting of multinational firms. However, the more accurate measures of tax bur-
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dens as perceived by entrepreneurs are effective tax rates, which are usually calculated
based on the approach by Devereux and Griffith (2003) for a hypothetical standardized
investment project. Said measures do not only take the statutory tax rates into account,
but also other taxes imposed on corporate income and the legal definition of the tax base,
which is defined by national regulations concerning tax allowances or depreciation rights,
for instance. The effective average tax rate (EATR) thus indicates the tax burden which
an investor faces for a profitable investment project, whereas the effective marginal tax
rate (EMTR) indicates the tax burden of a marginal investment.11 Consequently, all of
these measures are forward-looking in the sense that they reflect the tax burden which
an investor faces for an investment decision in a particular year.12 In brief, the relevance
of these measures for our question at hand can be summarized as follows: variation of
the CITR (which has fallen in almost all European countries in the observation period
as discussed in the literature cited above) explicitly reflects differences in the level of
the headline tax rate as set directly by the national tax legislature, whereas changes of
EMTR reflect changes in the tax legislature either affecting the level of the CITR and
other relevant taxes on capital, or the definition of the tax base, whereas the latter tends
to counteract the former effect to a certain degree due to a tendency of broadening the
tax bases (see Devereux and Griffith (2003)). A detailed descriptive overview of the tax
data we apply can be found in Table 9 in the appendix.
3.2 Measuring ideology
The accurate measurement of political ideological is highly relevant for our empirical anal-
ysis – however, this aspect has until now not received much attention in the economic
literature on partisan politics. A large proportion of studies measure the impact of a
government’s or legislature’s ideological orientation on the policy output by including a
dummy variable which indicates whether a left-wing or Christian democrat party leads the
(coalition) government or not. As can be seen from Table 1, almost all studies related to
our work apply this kind of data, which is obtained either from the Worldbank Database
of Political Institutions (DPI), or from the ordinal ranking of party governments from
11As Devereux and Griffith (2003) discuss, the EATR is equal to a weighted average of the EMTR
and the CITR. The empirical results for the EATR are similar to those of EMTR and CITR and will
therefore not be reported in the following.
12In particular, we resort to the data calculated by Overesch and Rincke (2009a) and Overesch and
Rincke (2009b). A more thorough description of the data and the assumptions underlying the calculation
of EATR and EMTR can be found therein.
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left-wing, centre-left, centre, centre-right and right-wing.
However, any “party family approach” is regarded as highly undertheorized in political
science. Moreover, the disadvantages for our panel analysis are evident: (i) the use of
these categorizations does not allow for international differences within party families
(e.g., the British New Labour can be assumed to be much more centrist than their French
Socialist counterpart), (ii) these categorizations do not allow for changes of party posi-
tions over time (which are frequent as will be discussed below), (iii) they do not allow for
differentiations between single policy areas (however, a liberal position in economic pol-
icy is certainly not equivalent to a right-wing position in social policies, and vice versa).
Among the more elaborate methods which exist in political science in order to estimate
programmatic positions of political actors beyond simple categorization13, we choose data
based on the quantitative content analysis of party manifestos.
Further methods are as well quite common in political science, but exhibit marked disad-
vantages for our analysis. First, the analysis of the legislative voting behavior of politicians
allows one to locate political actors on at least one policy dimension. This indicator has
been applied in the related economic literature in the analysis of the attitudes of European
parliamentarians towards corporate tax harmonization (Osterloh and Heinemann (2008))
and several studies of the U.S. congress originating from Poole and Rosenthal (1985).
However, in parliamentary democracies with strongly disciplined parties, an analysis of
roll call votes would sooner result in the extraction of a conflict line between the gov-
ernment and opposition camp than in an identification of policy dimensions within the
parliament. Second, programmatic positions of parties can be derived from elite or mass
surveys, as well as expert surveys. The latter have been conducted on an irregular basis,
e.g., by Benoit and Laver (2006) and Laver and Hunt (1992). As shown in Table 1, this
method has already found some application in related empirical research on corporate
taxation. As already indicated, one important problem when referring to this approach
is that expert surveys are temporally stable and can neither account for variations in the
respective party policy positions nor for potential changes in the party-specific dimension
saliencies. However, if we take the results of the two cited studies seriously, the program-
matic orientation and issue saliency of parties did indeed change between the time periods
in which both expert surveys were conducted.
13For an extensive review of the literature and more technical details on the methodologies, see Debus
(2009).
15
Therefore, in this paper we shall refer to data based on the content analysis of party policy
documents. In comparison to the other alternatives mentioned, the main advantage of
an analysis of policy documents can be seen in the high degree of their availability. Prior
to an election, nearly every party or party alliance publishes a program for government,
in which its goals for the next legislative period are outlined. Moreover, because election
programs normally have to be passed by a party congress or at least by a wider group of
party elites, they should more or less reflect the mean of all intra-party groups weighted by
their importance. Another aspect is relevant: the programmatic statements inside such
pre-election programmes can be used as a starting point for future coalition negotiations
and as a point of reference for the policy assertiveness in a coalition government formed
later.
While different types of computerized content analyses exist14, the most prominent data
source on party preferences for various policy areas is the dataset of the Manifesto Re-
search Group (MRG), which has been known since 1989 as the Comparative Manifesto
Project (CMP). The work of the MRG and the CMP, respectively, resulted in the largest
and most complex database, which includes saliencies on 56 policy issues, i.e., the em-
phasis of these issues which is measured as the share of quasi-sentences that are devoted
to the issues. The data covers 3,018 election manifestos from 54 countries since 1945.
We therefore use this dataset to quantify the policy preferences of each party represented
in the government in the time span and country sample under consideration here. By
doing so, we can account for changes in the general left-right placements and the explicit
economic policy preference of political actors.
From the raw data on issue saliencies, it is possible to determine indicators for ideology by
ascribing issues to certain broader categories such as left-right dimensions. For instance,
an emphasis on “social justice” in the manifestos characterizes a more left-wing party,
while an emphasis on “law and order” is characteristic for a more right-wing party. But
while both enter the general left-right dimension, obviously only the former enters an eco-
nomic specific left-right dimension. Whereas the general left-right dimension is already
provided by the CMP dataset (see Budge et al., 2001), the manifesto dataset moreover
allows for the determination of several more refined ideological indicators. We therefore
14One can distinguish between partly and completely computerized approaches. While the approaches
mentioned first require the programming of a dictionary that contains some a priori defined signal words,
fully computerized techniques like Wordscores or Wordfish require the full text of programmatic docu-
ments, which is not available for our country sample and time span (see, e.g., Debus (2009)).
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refer to an operationalization of the economic left-right policy dimension provided by
Cusack and Engelhardt (2002) (called ‘myrl3’ therein). This variable explicitly includes
CMP categories that only deal with economic and welfare policy15. Additionally, we test
our empirical methods with various other measurements of the (economic) left-right po-
sition of political parties. For instance, the Cusack and Engelhardt (2002) dataset also
provides a measure of the degree of economic liberalism (‘markecon’), as well as welfare
policies16. To test for the robustness of the effect of our variable on the ideological ori-
entation, we further created an additional index that covers non-economic social policy
only(covering issues such as family values or immigration)17. From these measures for the
party ideologies in advance of elections, we calculate the parliament’s ‘center of gravity’,
i.e. the position of each party represented in the parliament is weighted by its relative
seat share. This allows for estimating the overall position of a legislature for both the
left-right and the other policy dimensions. Moreover, we will add the DPI data discussed
above to the empirical analyzes, for which the center of gravity of the government is de-
termined equivalently based on the seat shares of the governing parties. Thus, we are
able to compare the results obtained by our measures with those which are obtained by
that of one of the most frequently used data sources for ideology applied in the related
literature.
3.3 Further variables
In our empirical analysis we investigate an unbalanced panel consisting of up to 32 Eu-
ropean countries in the period from 1980 to 2006.18 Concerning the coverage, our panel
is highly comparable with most recent empirical analyses of tax competition in Europe,
such as Devereux et al.(2008) or Overesch and Rincke (2009b), thus rendering our re-
15The relevant right-wing categories are (CMP codes in parantheses): Free Enterprise (per401), Eco-
nomic Orthodoxy (per414), Governmental and Administrative Efficiency (per313). Left-wing categories:
Market Regulation (per403), Economic Planning (per404), Keynesian Demand Management (per409),
Controlled Economy (per412), Nationalisation (per413), Social Justice (per503), Welfare State Expan-
sion (per504).
16Calculated as (per401 + per414)/2, and (per503 + per504)/2, respectively.
17Right-wing categories: National Way of Life: Positive (per601), Traditional Morality: Positive
(per603), Law and Order (per605), Social Harmony (per606), Multiculturalism: Negative (per608). Left-
wing categories: Social Justice (per503), Way of Life: Negative (per602), Traditional Morality: Negative
(per604), Multiculturalism: Positive (per607).
18The scope of our panel is restricted by the availability of tax data, which starts at the earliest in
1980 for some western European countries and for most eastern European countries in the beginning of
the 1990s, as well as the availability of CMP data which is missing for some countries in the most recent
years. See Table 9 for a detailed overview on the covered period.
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sults highly comparable to this strand of literature. Our empirical model resembles this
literature as well; in particular, we refer to it with regard to the choice of our control
variables. These comprise the top personal income tax rates (PITR) as well as several
national socio-economic characteristics, which are depicted in Table 8 in the appendix.
One aspect which has high relevance in other papers focussing explicitly on the impact of
globalization on corporate taxation is the choice of an appropriate globalization indica-
tor. Usually, globalization is proxied by the two flow variables of trade openness and FDI
flows, plus an index measuring capital market liberalization in some cases. In contrast to
this, we will follow the approach of a compound index to measure globalization. In par-
ticular, we apply the KOF index of globalization, which is introduced by Dreher (2006a).
This index does not only comprise these “standard” flow variables, but also a number of
further variables reflecting aspects of economic, political and social globalization. The
KOF indicator has the advantage that it reflects the long-term dynamics of globalization
better than flow variables, such as FDI flows, which are often exposed to volatile patterns.
It has already found some application in related works, e.g., Potrafke (2009) and Dreher
(2006b). However, we suspect that the issue of reverse causality is relevant, as several of
the flow variables (in particular, FDI flows) are affected by corporate taxation. Therefore,
we alter the KOF index by subducting the flow variables component.19
Moreover, we include individual data on educational backgrounds of heads of government
in our analysis. This is based on the hypothesis that the educational background might
have an impact on corporate tax policy due to different perceptions of capital mobility
as discussed in section 2. Here, we rely on the extensive data set collected by Dreher
et al. (2009), who identify an impact of education on market liberalizing reforms. We
extend their data set by several countries missing in their analysis.20 In our analysis,
we restrict ourselves to the inclusion of dummies for a final degree in economics as well
as in law. While the first group has been identified in Dreher et al. (2009) as being
significantly different in their political outcomes, lawyers are of interest as they constitute
the by far largest group of heads of government (with a share of about one third of all
19Note that the remaining components of the KOF index are still a good proxy for the flow variables,
the correlation is 0.42. Consequently, the transformation does not affect the effects of the other variables
considerably.
20Unlike their analysis, we also include Switzerland, which does not have a single head of government in
the traditional sense but a Federal Council consisting of seven members with equal rights. We calculate
the values as the share of members with the respective educational background in the given year.
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observations).21
Finally, we include a variable which captures the fragmentation of governments and hence
proxies intra-governmental conflict. For this purpose, we assume that the absolute number
of parties in a coalition government plays an important role in the determination of the
willingness to make decisions. This is in line with the seminal literature on veto players
originating from Tsebelis (1995), which regards the number of parties in a coalition as a
major time-varying factor for the capacity to produce policy changes.
4 Empirical model and results
In the specification of our empirical model, we will refer closely to the most recent ap-
proaches in the public finance literature which were cited above. These approaches mainly
rely on panel data approaches using fixed effects in order to cope with unobservable time-
invariant characteristics, and put increasingly emphasis on estimating the direct inter-
actions of countries in the choice of the tax level. However, empirical analysis at the
interface of economics and political science regularly confronts the researcher with several
difficulties which have to be considered in the choice of the optimal research design. These
difficulties are described in detail in Kittel and Winner (2005) and Plümper et al. (2005)
and will be further discussed in the following subsections.
One further important aspect is the choice of the appropriate lag structure in the model.
In tax policy, new tax legislature concerning corporate taxation almost always comes into
effect at the 1st of January of a given year. Therefore, tax rates at point t can only be
ascribed to political decisions made in year t-1 which rest on the political environment
at that point of time. Hence, for our benchmark model we consider the first lags of all
exogenous variables with the exception of the PITR, whose next-year value is assumed to
be set simultaneously with corporate taxation in the preceding year. In addition, we will
examine the lag of the effect of changes in legislature on changes in taxes more rigourously
in a first difference specification, which will be introduced later in this section.
Finally, a standard problem which is inherent in the related empirical literature using the
statutory tax rates is the serial correlation of tax rates, as these are usually infrequently
adjusted. In the following, in those cases where this assumption is confirmed by the
Wooldridge test, we follow Devereux et al. (2008) and present standard errors which are
21More disaggregate analyses of other educational backgrounds were tested, but did not deliver signif-
icantly different results, also partly due to low numbers of cases.
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clustered by country.
4.1 Fixed effects estimation
In our benchmark specification we apply a fixed effects model which is close to the related
literature. The use of fixed effects is reasonable since several time invariant factors can
hardly be controlled for and thus we run the risk that an omitted variable bias interferes
with our results22. We introduce the following specification as our benchmark model, with
αt representing the time fixed effects, ηi representing the country fixed effects and Zi,t−1
the vector of socio-economic control variables:
Taxi,t = β1 + β2Ideologyi,t−1 + β3Ideologyi,t−1 × Trend+ β4NumberPartiesi,t−1
+ β5EducEconomics+ β6EducLaw + β7PITRi,t + Zi,t−1θ + αt + ηi + i,t
(10)
We estimate the presented model with our three different measures for ideology (see
Table 2), i.e. the general left-right dimension derived from the CMP data (CMP), the
economic left-right dimension from the same source (CMP econ), and the general left-
right dimension obtained from the DPI data (DPI ). In all cases the ideology variable
shows a negative sign, thus indicating a higher tax burden generated by left legislatures.23
However, it can be seen that the impact of political ideology differs markedly depending
on the choice of the variable. They are only statistically significant for the variables gen-
erated from the CMP data, i.e., the general left-right dimension as well as the economic
left-right dimension, while the results for the DPI data are always insignificant. This
reflects our expectation that only the CMP data allows a reasonable comparison across
borders, as it allows for differences in ideological positions of national parties despite that
they belong to the same party family. Interestingly enough, the effect is for all indicators
more pronounced when the statutory tax rate is applied and not the EMTR (this pattern
is similar for the following approaches). This is not surprising given the fact that the
statutory tax rate is the most visible component of the tax system, so that we would
expect that partisan politics play the strongest role concerning this part of the tax sys-
tem. Moreover, the statutory tax rate is the relevant factor shaping incentives for profit
22The Hausman test supports the use of a fixed effects model and rejects a random effects model in all
cases.
23Note that the coefficient β2 is evaluated at the point where the value of the trend is zero, which is
set at the year 1990. The marginal effects for other years result from β2 + β3 × trend. For a discussion
of the interpretation of lower-order coefficients in interaction models, see, e.g., Brambor et al. (2006) .
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shifting activities of multi-nationals.
Moreover, a positive effect of the interaction of ideology and the time trend points to a
diminishing impact of ideology, which is at least for the CITR highly significant. In figure
1, this effect is illustrated exemplary for the first specification of Table 2. The marginal
effects and the bounds for the 95% interval are depicted for all years which are included
in our analysis. As can be seen, the initial highly negative effect of ideology on the CITR
becomes smaller over time, and finally becomes insignificant at the end of the nineties.
This development is qualitatively the same for almost all of our regressions, indicating
that the effect of ideology breaks down at some point in time.
Figure 1: Marginal effects of ideology (CMP) on CITR
Moreover, the number of parties has the expected positive effect on the tax measure,
so that coalitions containing a larger number of political parties generate higher levels
of corporate taxation. However, this effect is only statistically significant in two of the
regressions on the EMTR. Moreover, we do not find an unambiguous result for the effect
of the educational background in economics, while the coefficient for the lawyer dummy
is positive throughout and significant in at least one case. However, the effects of these
variables on the levels of taxation are not very robust, and a more short-term effect which
has interfered with long-term influences cannot be dismissed. The short-term dynamics
of tax setting will be examined more closely later on.
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Table 2: Estimation results – fixed effects
Dependent variable CITR EMTR
Ideology measure CMP CMP Econ DPI CMP CMP Econ DPI
Ideologyt−1 -0.177*** -0.070*** -1.094 -0.068* -0.042** -0.831
(0.048) (0.023) (0.761) (0.038) (0.020) (0.547)
Ideologyt−1 × trend 0.016*** 0.006*** 0.201** 0.001 0.002 0.187***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.084) (0.006) (0.002) (0.063)
Number partiest−1 0.384 0.254 0.312 0.791* 0.731* 0.745
(0.544) (0.528) (0.579) (0.436) (0.443) (0.440)
Globalizationt−1 -0.421** -0.304* -0.337* -0.230 -0.201 -0.161
(0.170) (0.174) (0.169) (0.162) (0.175) (0.156)
Educ Economicst−1 -0.029 -0.358 -0.270 0.969 0.740 0.561
(1.571) (1.584) (1.770) (1.712) (1.633) (1.642)
Educ Lawt−1 1.754 1.309 1.376 3.097* 2.740 2.392
(1.615) (1.679) (1.857) (1.815) (1.699) (1.856)
GDP per capitat−1 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP growtht−1 -0.200 -0.183 -0.194 -0.091 -0.092 -0.085
(0.129) (0.130) (0.122) (0.104) (0.104) (0.098)
Public consumptiont−1 -0.234 -0.234 -0.352 -0.350 -0.300 -0.340
(0.441) (0.430) (0.450) (0.357) (0.353) (0.368)
Population oldt−1 3.975*** 3.544*** 3.763*** 0.983 1.104 0.944
(0.839) (0.881) (0.909) (0.746) (0.813) (0.681)
Population youngt−1 0.643 0.625 0.700 -0.781 -0.841 -0.718
(0.774) (0.788) (0.808) (0.687) (0.664) (0.687)
Populationt−1 -0.310 -0.412 -0.300 -0.081 -0.126 -0.103
(0.719) (0.661) (0.548) (0.787) (0.749) (0.725)
PITRt 0.441** 0.562*** 0.481** 0.407** 0.458** 0.435**
(0.190) (0.189) (0.188) (0.190) (0.190) (0.172)
Constant -22.192 -24.850 -22.096 25.860 21.532 19.175
(28.419) (30.563) (28.652) (31.876) (31.306) (27.994)
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Period Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 500 500 500 500 500 500
R-squared 0.70 0.71 0.69 0.59 0.60 0.60
Standard errors robust to serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5%
level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
In the regressions presented in Table 3, similarly to Devereux et al.(2008) we consider
in addition to our other control variables the direct interaction of European states in
their tax setting. Thus, for every year we include the average tax rate of the respective
country’s direct neighbors which is denoted as NeighborTaxi,t =
∑j ωijTaxj,t, with j
denoting the countries defined as neighbors of country i and ωij as the corresponding
weighting matrix.24 Due to the presence of spatial autocorrelation, we instrument this
endogenous right-hand variable with the weighted average of the other control variables. It
can be seen that this extension of the empirical model slightly drives down the significance
of the “general left-right” ideology variable, but it stays significant at conventional levels
for both specifications applying the “economic left-right” dimension.
Until now, we have relied on the general left-right dimension of political ideology as
well as on the economic left-right dimension. However, as is well known from political
science literature, such a unidimensional indicator falls short in explaining the underlying
positions disaggregated by policy areas (see Benoit and Laver (2006) for a disaggregation
24We assume a uniform weighting of all direct neighbors. For the definition of direct neighborhood, we
follow Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002).
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Table 3: Estimation results – fixed effects and interaction
Dependent variable CITR EMTR
Ideology measure CMP CMP Econ DPI CMP CMP Econ DPI
Ideologyt−1 -0.128** -0.061*** -1.044 -0.014 -0.034** -0.631
(0.058) (0.022) (0.812) (0.046) (0.016) (0.422)
Ideologyt−1 × trend 0.012** 0.004* 0.171* -0.005 -0.001 0.159***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.093) (0.007) (0.002) (0.055)
Number partiest−1 0.106 0.005 0.058 0.564 0.525 0.564
(0.580) (0.558) (0.624) (0.433) (0.385) (0.447)
Globalizationt−1 -0.366** -0.306* -0.295* -0.196 -0.238 -0.145
(0.172) (0.173) (0.168) (0.153) (0.169) (0.154)
Educ Economicst−1 -0.827 -0.878 -1.017 0.722 0.763 0.358
(1.811) (1.805) (1.974) (1.710) (1.569) (1.582)
Educ Lawt−1 1.980 1.787 1.666 3.540* 3.444** 2.798
(1.734) (1.792) (2.019) (1.839) (1.653) (1.897)
NeighborTaxt 0.475*** 0.472*** 0.517*** 0.439*** 0.449*** 0.390***
(0.140) (0.151) (0.127) (0.096) (0.095) (0.075)
GDP per capitat−1 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP growtht−1 -0.180 -0.179 -0.177 -0.027 -0.047 -0.027
(0.126) (0.127) (0.124) (0.095) (0.091) (0.092)
Public consumptiont−1 -0.070 -0.070 -0.117 -0.292 -0.228 -0.242
(0.438) (0.441) (0.435) (0.317) (0.320) (0.321)
Population oldt−1 3.862*** 3.648*** 3.692*** 0.793 1.140 0.828
(0.843) (0.796) (0.834) (0.691) (0.683) (0.630)
Population youngt−1 1.089 1.007 1.162 -0.485 -0.616 -0.464
(0.782) (0.812) (0.811) (0.649) (0.625) (0.672)
Populationt−1 -0.704 -0.791 -0.752 -0.432 -0.469 -0.427
(0.631) (0.607) (0.541) (0.623) (0.577) (0.606)
PITRt 0.467** 0.543*** 0.496*** 0.456** 0.455** 0.468***
(0.181) (0.191) (0.178) (0.180) (0.187) (0.163)
Constant -56.423** 25.729 -44.181 18.396 60.620 16.690
(21.244) (54.337) (27.721) (28.043) (53.372) (24.055)
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Period Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 498 498 498 498 498 498
R-squared 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.82 0.83
NeighborTaxt was instrumented with the weighted average of the other control variables.
Standard errors robust to serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5%
level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
based on expert survey results). Although a high correlation between the components of
the left-right indexes can be expected, they do not necessarily point to the same direction
as discussed above.
Since our data based on the CMP database allows us to construct elaborate ideology
indicators, we can analyze the effects of ideological positions with regard to few delimited
policy areas. This procedure enables us to reveal which specific elements of the general (or
economic) left-right dimension are the driving forces of the partisan effects detected above.
Based on the specifications which include the neighboring countries’ tax rates, we apply
three disaggregated ideology variables: two of the main components of the economic left-
right dimension, i.e. welfare policies and the attitude towards free markets (MarketEcon),
as well as non-economic social politics (Society), which capture elements of the general
left-right dimension that do not encompass economic policies. The results, which are
shown in Table 4, indicate that we only obtain significant results for the attitude towards
welfare policies in all specifications (theWelfare dimension enters the left-right dimensions
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negatively, so that a high value indicates a more pro-welfare, i.e., left-wing position).
This result reveals that parties which put more emphasis on the welfare state did indeed
generate higher taxation, but, interestingly enough, the other economic dimension does
not show coefficients deviating significantly from zero. The indicator for social policies is
at least significant in the specification applying the statutory tax rates, which indicates
that the non-economic dimension has at least some explanatory content, although it is
far lower than that of the economic indicator applied above.
Table 4: Estimation results – disaggregated ideology measures
Dependent variable CITR EMTR
Ideology measure Welfare MarketEcon Society Welfare MarketEcon Society
Ideologyt−1 0.910** -0.002 -0.306** 0.587* 0.346 -0.193
(0.340) (0.470) (0.123) (0.306) (0.461) (0.132)
Ideologyt−1 × trend -0.091** -0.060 0.053*** -0.046 -0.091 0.035**
(0.037) (0.055) (0.012) (0.039) (0.058) (0.016)
NeighbourTaxt 0.337** 0.508*** 0.554*** 0.306*** 0.409*** 0.423***
(0.150) (0.156) (0.127) (0.104) (0.085) (0.094)
KOF globalizationt−1 -0.260 -0.265 -0.272* -0.134 -0.126 -0.123
(0.181) (0.160) (0.149) (0.179) (0.156) (0.153)
GDP per capitat−1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP growtht−1 -0.202 -0.170 -0.159 -0.063 -0.022 -0.041
(0.138) (0.137) (0.131) (0.111) (0.110) (0.101)
Public consumptiont−1 -0.161 -0.275 -0.066 -0.283 -0.433 -0.233
(0.390) (0.398) (0.444) (0.332) (0.326) (0.338)
Population oldt−1 3.518*** 2.425*** 3.644*** 1.039* 0.614 1.043*
(0.767) (0.922) (0.804) (0.608) (0.503) (0.589)
Population youngt−1 1.097 1.340* 1.199 -0.279 -0.089 -0.249
(0.687) (0.671) (0.709) (0.600) (0.556) (0.601)
Populationt−1 -0.600 -0.762 -0.410 -0.237 -0.420 -0.146
(0.462) (0.617) (0.641) (0.490) (0.532) (0.655)
PITRt 0.513*** 0.460** 0.498*** 0.457** 0.363** 0.469**
(0.172) (0.190) (0.178) (0.187) (0.176) (0.183)
Constant -37.430 -30.569 -50.061 24.156 59.380 6.951
(22.429) (60.187) (21.678) (19.412) (50.033) (18.270)
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Period Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 500 500 500 500 500 500
R-squared 0.85 0.83 0.84 0.82 0.81 0.81
NeighbourTaxt was instrumented with the weighted average of the other control variables.
Standard errors robust to serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5%
level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
4.2 Providing for level effects
One drawback of earlier papers which do not find an effect of government ideology might
be – in addition to the choice of possibly inadequate date as discussed above – the fact
that these papers usually rely exclusively on the use of fixed effects estimation.25 This
is well-founded for the questions analyzed in these papers, as the application of fixed ef-
fects prevents unobserved time-invariant country-specific factors from interfering with the
variable of interest. However, the estimation with fixed effects may not be appropriate
25Among the works summarized in Table 1, Schwarz (2007) is the only paper that estimates a specifi-
cation without fixed effects.
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in cases where theory predicts level effects of the independent variables on the dependent
variable, as these effects would then be erased by the application of country-fixed effects
(see the discussion in Plümper et al. (2005)). In our data set, one prime example is the
size of the countries which is largely time-invariant so that robust findings cannot be ex-
pected from fixed effects estimations. However, the theoretical literature (see Bucovetsky
(1991)) predicts a level effect on corporate taxation which can be expected to be found
in a cross-country comparison, but by no means in the marginal variation of the variable
over the time period within countries. This assumption can be confirmed by the results
shown in Table 5 where we omit the use of country fixed effects. There, we find the
expected positive effect highly significant, in contrast to the regressions using fixed effects
in the preceding subsection. Similarly, level effects are also of importance for our analyses
of partisan effects. In this regard, our CMP data on party ideology has the advantage
of capturing these level effects since its scales are comparable across countries, so that
differences in levels reflect actual differences in ideological positions between parties in
different countries.
The coefficients of the ideology variable again point to a negative effect of right-wing legis-
latures on corporate tax burdens in all specifications. Again, we cannot detect significant
partisan effects by means of the DPI data, while the indicators derived from the CMP
are significant in all specifications. Moreover, the estimation without fixed effects allows
us to add some time-invariant variables to our analysis. These comprise dummies for the
membership in the EU and a communist past of a country which might have an impact
on corporate taxation. Moreover, constitutional factors which are known from the cross-
country analyses of Persson and Tabellini (2003), such as dummies for the presidential
and the plurality system, are added. However, the results which are reported in Table 5
show that none of these time-invariant variables has a significant impact on the level of
taxation.
Finally, in contrast to most evidence from the related literature, the modified KOF index
is at least significant in the regression on the statutory tax rates and shows the expected
negative sign.26 This finding again reflects the importance of taking level effects in the
explanatory variables seriously once there is a link to theory, as is also the case for our
CMP data.
26Note that the application of the original values of the KOF index leads to significant results in all
specifications.
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Table 5: Estimation results – no fixed effects
Dependent variable CITR EMTR
Ideology measure CMP CMP Econ DPI CMP CMP Econ DPI
Ideologyt−1 -0.125** -0.041* -0.530 -0.212*** -0.076*** -1.506
(0.048) (0.022) (1.176) (0.070) (0.022) (1.040)
Ideologyt−1 × trend 0.015** 0.007** 0.117 0.002 0.003 0.141
(0.006) (0.003) (0.116) (0.010) (0.002) (0.096)
Globalizationt−1 -0.263** -0.256** -0.247** -0.051 -0.092 -0.063
(0.096) (0.094) (0.100) (0.117) (0.115) (0.120)
GDP per capitat−1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP growtht−1 -0.128 -0.086 -0.106 -0.112 0.010 0.039
(0.148) (0.143) (0.144) (0.169) (0.166) (0.152)
Public consumptiont−1 0.296 0.330 0.264 0.077 0.052 0.060
(0.226) (0.224) (0.234) (0.217) (0.245) (0.232)
Population oldt−1 1.206** 1.124* 1.052* 0.043 -0.034 -0.121
(0.575) (0.554) (0.609) (0.559) (0.634) (0.604)
Population youngt−1 0.388 0.400 0.326 0.075 0.014 0.042
(0.399) (0.366) (0.423) (0.323) (0.369) (0.323)
Populationt−1 0.192*** 0.188*** 0.185*** 0.155*** 0.157*** 0.149**
(0.064) (0.059) (0.066) (0.055) (0.048) (0.061)
PITRt 0.231* 0.261** 0.243* 0.180 0.247* 0.202
(0.124) (0.117) (0.120) (0.137) (0.139) (0.131)
Presidential -0.629 -1.645 -0.145 -3.945 -5.615 -5.574
(3.635) (3.550) (3.901) (5.510) (6.034) (6.823)
Plurality -5.668 -5.723* -5.501 -0.122 -0.663 -0.607
(3.761) (3.348) (3.906) (2.683) (2.215) (2.687)
Former Communist -3.065 -1.655 -2.833 -0.429 -1.359 -0.519
(3.570) (3.486) (3.556) (3.159) (3.500) (3.767)
EU member -1.497 -1.026 -1.123 -2.036 -1.760 -1.754
(2.169) (2.192) (1.912) (2.149) (2.365) (2.368)
Catholic 0.034 0.036 0.031 -0.003 0.014 -0.000
(0.022) (0.023) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024)
Constant 8.165 5.708 10.531 8.938 10.512 10.693
(13.844) (12.535) (14.387) (15.027) (15.997) (16.975)
Country FE no no no no no no
Period Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 502 502 502 502 502 502
R-squared 0.69 0.70 0.68 0.58 0.58 0.55
Standard errors robust to serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5%
level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
4.3 First difference specification
As discussed above, one main problem of our data is due to the serial correlation of many
of the variables. Tax rates are adjusted only occasionally, as well as several of the other
variables such as globalization which are also dominated by long-term trends. As Kittel
and Winner (2005) point out, one attractive solution to this problem is the estimation
of a model in differences. However, such a specification requires a completely different
interpretation of the partisan effect which is measured: we no longer explain the effect of
the decision-maker’s ideological position on the level of taxation, but rather the changes
in the level of taxation with changes in the ideological position of the legislature.27
This consideration clarifies why it is hard to achieve definite results using conventional
measures of ideology such as left-right dummies in such a specification. With these mea-
sures, the value for government ideology does not change frequently, since changes occur
27Despite the theoretical attractiveness of the approach, it has only been applied in Basinger and
Hallerberg (2004) in the related empirical literature.
26
only in cases where power is passed over from the left to the right or vice versa, so that
these may fail to explain variations in the level of taxation. Our data, however, overcomes
the problem. As party ideologies measured by the CMP data change with every election,
the center of gravity shifts regularly. These changes can then also be caused by changes
in the ideological positions of parties which stay in power or by changes in the strength
of the coalition partners, even when the power stays in the hand of the left-wing or the
right-wing of the political spectrum, respectively.
In this approach, we differentiate our left-hand side variable and our ideology variables,
as well as all of our control variables which have been applied in the precedent analysis.
Only two variables enter the regression in levels: first, we expect that a higher level of
veto power within the governing coalition impacts the decision-making, so that Number
parties enters the equation in levels. Second, we rely on TaxGap as a measure which re-
flects the direct competitive pressure from neighboring countries on the local tax setting
in a given year. It is attained as the difference between a country’s own level of taxation
and the average of its direct neighbors for each of the two measures applied, respectively:
TaxGapi,t = Taxi,t −
∑j ωijTaxj,t, for all j which are defined as neighbors of i. Our
estimations are then based on the following specification:
∆Taxi,t = β1 + β2∆Ideologyi,t + β3∆Ideologyi,t−1 + β4∆Ideologyi,t−2
+ β5NumberPartiesi,t−1 + β6TaxGapi,t−1 + β7∆PITRi,t + ∆Zi,t−1θ + i,t
(11)
The results which are shown in Table 628 indicate that our measure of competitive
pressure has the expected effect (tax cuts become larger in case the own tax level exceeds
the neighbors’ level). We include changes in ideology within the current year as well as
in the two preceding years. The effect of concurrent changes is not significantly different
from zero and confirms our assumption that taxes react with a delay to changes in the
political environment. By contrast, the first lag is negative once again for the CMP data
and highly significant for both tax measures, while the second lag of ideological changes
also has a negative impact, but the coefficient is not significantly different from zero.
This result again confirms the existence of a partisan effect on corporate taxation, which
is reflected in the fact that a shift in ideology to the right – ceteris paribus – leads to a
28The differentiation eliminates the country fixed effects in the data. Hence, the null hypothesis of no
fixed effects (i.e., the pooled model) cannot be rejected at standard significance levels anymore, so that
the application of fixed effects will be dismissed in the following regressions.
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Table 6: Estimation results – specification in differences
Dependent variable ∆CITR ∆EMTR
Ideology measure CMP DPI CMP DPI
∆ Ideologyt -0.010 0.046 -0.026 0.155
(0.023) (0.441) (0.026) (0.398)
∆ Ideologyt−1 -0.034** 0.118 -0.055*** 0.106
(0.016) (0.324) (0.021) (0.301)
∆ Ideologyt−2 -0.035 0.498 -0.011 0.512
(0.023) (0.347) (0.022) (0.396)
Number partiest−1 0.205** 0.180** 0.112 0.084
(0.091) (0.092) (0.139) (0.142)
Tax Gapt−1 -0.041*** -0.044*** -0.066*** -0.070***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.024)
Educ Economicst−1 0.267 0.274 0.060 0.085
(0.375) (0.380) (0.434) (0.429)
Educ Lawt−1 0.655** 0.653** 0.817*** 0.814***
(0.302) (0.306) (0.285) (0.293)
∆ KOF globalizationt−1 0.095 0.102 0.011 0.014
(0.091) (0.090) (0.090) (0.089)
GDP growtht−1 0.004 0.014 0.044 0.063
(0.048) (0.050) (0.039) (0.041)
∆ Public consumptiont−1 -0.249 -0.276 -0.201 -0.225
(0.199) (0.167) (0.149) (0.142)
∆ Population oldt−1 -0.665 -0.277 -0.446 0.002
(0.855) (0.848) (0.944) (0.933)
∆ Population youngt−1 -0.214 -0.202 -0.508 -0.475
(0.558) (0.558) (0.615) (0.619)
∆ Populationt−1 0.135 0.250 0.529 0.616
(0.652) (0.657) (0.582) (0.610)
∆ PITRt 0.338*** 0.339*** 0.241*** 0.238***
(0.108) (0.109) (0.087) (0.088)
Constant -1.648*** -1.661*** -1.418*** -1.467***
(0.385) (0.401) (0.420) (0.437)
Country FE no no no no
Period Dummies no no no no
Observations 467 461 467 461
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.12
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant
at the 1% level.
cut of the corporate tax rate in the following year. The DPI data does not deliver any
robust results in these estimations.
Finally, the coefficient for number parties has a positive sign and is significant at least in
the specifications applying the CITR, which shows an adverse effect of larger coalitions
on cuts of corporate taxation. And even more so, the effect of lawyers on tax changes is
positive as before, but now highly significant in all cases. These findings give at least some
indication that large coalitions as well as the leadership of a lawyer averted tax cuts to
a certain degree and, thus, counteracted the tendency of lowering corporate taxes which
prevailed in the period under investigation.
4.4 Possible endogeneity of ideology
Empirical research on partisan effects on fiscal policy regularly treats political ideology
as strictly exogenous. At first glance, however, this assumption is questionable, as the
legislature’s and government’s ideology is the stringent result of elections. Consequently,
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it might be argued that changes in the external environment (in our case we might think
of increasing pressure from tax competition as being relevant) impact policy outcomes
through elections, which generate a new composition of ideology. Moreover, there is sub-
stantial evidence from political science that platforms of parties change systematically over
time as a reaction to changes in the economic environment (Kim and Fording (2001)),
which is of additional relevance for the time-variant CMP data we employ. Thus, one
could argue that in the case of corporate tax policy, the declining competitiveness of a
country due to the tax cuts of its neighbors might cause a gain in votes of right-wing
parties (or a shift of left-wing parties to the right), and that the domestic tax cut in
the subsequent period (inevitable due to the decline in competitiveness) happens under a
more rightist legislature than before. In this case, an interpretation of the actual partisan
impact on the tax cut becomes difficult.29
These critiques can be mitigated by the fact that policy preferences which are revealed
by voters at the ballot box encompass a wide field of programmatic aspects which go
far beyond the scope of different positions in economic policy. From that perspective, it
is highly unlikely that the national position in international tax competition has a very
strong impact on the voters’ decisions, which would theoretically be expected as a right-
shift of the median voter in case of intensifying pressure from other countries. Similar
arguments hold true for the effect of increasing globalization.
However, we address these concerns by creating a replication of our first difference regres-
sions in which we exchange the left- and the right-hand side variables. We then explain
changes in the ideological position by the Tax gap in the previous year complemented by
changes in the other exogenous variables, proceeding as before. In these regressions, which
are presented in Table 7, we cannot detect a major effect of Tax gap or Globalization on
changes in the ideological position. The only variable which has a strong effect on changes
in ideology is the lagged GDP growth. This finding is interesting as this effect is hypothe-
sized by the related literature in political science (see Kim and Fording (2001)). However,
this variable has not been found to have a notable impact on corporate taxation in any of
the regressions presented above. Consequently, we conclude that the possible endogeneity
of ideology cannot be regarded as a major problem in the empirical approaches presented
above.
29See Besley & Case (2003:38) for a similar argumentation with regard to welfare spending.
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Table 7: Estimation results – explaining ideological changes
Dependent variable ∆ CMP ∆ CMP Econ ∆ DPI
Tax measure CITR EMTR CITR EMTR CITR EMTR
Tax Gapt−1 0.037 0.040 0.098 0.100 -0.000 0.002
(0.027) (0.029) (0.069) (0.067) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ KOF globalizationt−1 -0.034 -0.017 -0.580* -0.536 -0.004 -0.004
(0.124) (0.125) (0.338) (0.338) (0.018) (0.018)
GDP growtht−1 -0.247*** -0.248*** -0.725*** -0.730*** 0.007 0.007
(0.090) (0.090) (0.246) (0.246) (0.008) (0.008)
∆ Public consumptiont−1 -0.443 -0.434 -1.257 -1.235 0.024 0.025
(0.363) (0.361) (0.785) (0.778) (0.032) (0.032)
∆ Population oldt−1 -2.940* -2.615* -1.881 -1.043 -0.120 -0.114
(1.581) (1.550) (4.952) (4.862) (0.162) (0.161)
∆ Population youngt−1 -0.368 -0.299 -7.306** -7.135** -0.009 -0.006
(1.140) (1.133) (3.062) (3.062) (0.105) (0.105)
∆ Populationt−1 -1.256 -1.256 -2.617 -2.580 0.085 0.071
(1.230) (1.244) (2.304) (2.258) (0.082) (0.075)
Constant 1.139** 1.108** 1.959 1.871 -0.011 -0.009
(0.514) (0.512) (1.309) (1.287) (0.044) (0.043)
Country FE no no no no no no
Period Dummies no no no no no no
Observations 475 475 475 475 469 469
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant
at the 1% level.
5 Conclusions
We have shown that international tax competition is not an automatic process that trans-
lates external pressures, such as globalization or tax cuts of neighboring countries, directly
into domestic reactions. The relevance of partisan politics has been widely neglected both
in the theoretical as well as in the empirical public finance literature for quite a while – but
politics matter for corporate taxation, as our analysis has shown. Theoretically, we have
shown that there are two channels which hint at an effect of partisanship on corporate tax
policy: the former being differences in preferences towards the size of the public sector,
and the latter being different perceptions of the economic environment. Empirically, we
have shown that there is strong evidence that ideologies have indeed impacted corporate
taxes in Europe. This effect is generally more pronounced for the statutory tax rates than
for the effective marginal tax rates, but for which we also find a partisan effect. This might
be due to two different reasons: first, the statutory tax rate is the most visible component
of national tax systems, so that partisan politics which aim at satisfying the own clientele
should be the strongest there. Second, the statutory tax rates are relevant for profit-shift
activities of multi-national corporations. Hence, if ideology is correlated with the per-
ception of this phenomenon (i.e., leftist politicians assume a lower mobility of profits),
then this can also explain why the partisan effect is stronger for the statutory tax rates.
Unfortunately, we are not able to differentiate between these two channels based only on
our empirical results. Moreover, our results indicate that the general impact of national
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partisanship is diminishing. Thus, it affirms largely unproven claims from political sci-
ence that the impact of partisan politics on tax policies is restricted by globalization, and
also affirms related research on the partisan impact on expenditure policies. Beyond the
impact of partisan politics, we have identified two further factors which have interfered
with the general pressure on cutting tax rates: the fragmentation of government, as well
as the educational background of the respective head of government.
Concerning a more general purpose, our paper has underlined the importance of the ap-
propriate data choice for the overarching issue of analyzing partisan politics in public
finance. Our sophisticated measure of political ideologies delivers robust results, while
the simple use of dummy variables for party families points to the same direction, but
does not produce significant effects. In particular, it has been shown that for the ques-
tion at hand, mainly one very specific dimension of the complex left-right dimension is
of importance: the attitude towards the welfare state. As shown in the theoretical part,
this effect is in line with our predictions, which ascribe the partisan effect on corporate
taxation to differences in preferences for public goods provision.
In this regard, our study is the first to analyze the ideological impact on fiscal policy in a
more specific way than the general left-right dimension. The feasibility of an analysis in
which the left-right divergence is disaggregated into political positions concerning single
policy areas as provided by the CMP data might also be of interest for further applications
in the literature of partisan effects on economic policy. Similar to our results, it might be
suspected that it is also the welfare dimension which affects spending policies. However,
according to theory, this should change for other explanandums. Concerning the partisan
effect on market liberalization, for instance, theory predicts that other components of the
left-right dimension, such as the attitude towards the free market, should be the better
explanatory variables. Concerning other policy outcomes, such as the factors underly-
ing the partisan effect on growth30, theory is ambiguous thus calling for more elaborate
analyses.
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6 Appendix
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Description Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max Source
CMP Ideology mea-
sured for general
left-right dimen-
sion
-0.09 11.04 -30.60 36.47 own calculations, based
on CMP data and parlia-
ment compositions from
Cusack and Engelhardt
(2002) and Klingemann,
Volkens, Budge, Bara,
and McDonald (2006)
CMP econ Ideology mea-
sured for eco-
nomic left-right
dimension
-4.61 30.86 -92.65 56.45 ibid.
Society Ideology mea-
sured for societal
left-right dimen-
sion
3.19 5.18 -12.65 20.99 ibid.
MarketEcon Ideology mea-
sured for market
liberalism
2.52 1.70 0 9.51 ibid.
Welfare Ideology mea-
sured for welfare
policies
5.93 2.35 1.27 13.49 ibid.
DPI Ideology mea-
sured for general
left-right dimen-
sion
0.06 0.78 -1 1 own calculations, based
on database of Politi-
cal Institutions, Beck et
al.(2001)
Number
Parties
Number of parties
in coalition gov-
ernment
2.48 1.28 0 6 Database of Political
Institutions, Beck et
al.(2001)
PITR Highest personal
income tax rate
50.03 12.52 18.0 87.0 Overesch and Rincke
(2009b)
Globali-
zation
KOF global-
ization index
corrected by flow
variables
75.26 12.51 29.95 93.11 Dreher (2006a)
Educ Eco-
nomics
Dummy = 1 if
education in eco-
nomics
0.23 0.41 0 1 Dreher et al. (2009) up-
dated by various internet
sources
Educ Law Dummy = 1 if ed-
ucation in law
0.33 0.46 0 1 Dreher et al. (2009) up-
dated by various internet
sources
GDP cap GDP per capita in
US Dollar
22732.759844.59 2927.9 65807 World Bank, World De-
velopment Indicators
GDP
growth
annual growth
rate of real GDP
2.79 2.98 -11.89 12.7 World Bank, World De-
velopment Indicators
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Population Population in mil-
lions
20.22 23.84 0.25 82.54 IMF
Public
consump-
tion
Public consump-
tion as share of
GDP
19.58 4.54 5.69 29.94 World Bank, World De-
velopment Indicators
Population
old
Share of popula-
tion older than 65
14.11 2.28 4.53 19.50 World Bank, World De-
velopment Indicators
Population
young
Share of popula-
tion younger than
15
19.24 3.41 14.03 33.01 World Bank, World De-
velopment Indicators
Presidential Dummy = 1
if presidential
system
0.04 0.20 0 1 Database of Political
Institutions, Beck et
al.(2001)
Plurality Dummy = 1 if
election under
plurality rule
0.15 0.36 0 1 Database of Political
Institutions, Beck et
al.(2001)
Catholic Share of catholics 0.46 0.38 0 0.98 various sources
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